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Agreement of  1980. While the state was entitled to expropriate 
unused (and under-used) land, productive land in the hands of  
white owners could only be acquired if  the state was willing to 
pay a ‘market’ price’. The state was granted first refusal on all 
land sales, but was not obliged to purchase any property that 
it was offered. The intended beneficiaries (that is, the landless) 
were not directly involved in the transaction, and could not, 
therefore, constitute a ‘willing buyer’ – this role was reserved 
for the state alone. The concept of  WSWB in the Zimbabwean 
context, therefore, represented a state-led approach, whereby 
land would be acquired through a mix of  expropriation 
(effectively nationalisation) and negotiated purchase, with 
compensation paid at the equivalent of  market prices. 
WSWB entered the discourse around land reform in South 
Africa gradually during the period 1993–1996. It was entirely 
absent from the ANC’s Ready to govern document of  1992, 
which instead advocated expropriation and other non-market 
mechanisms. It was similarly absent from the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme of  1994. By the time of  the 
White Paper on South African Land Policy of  1997, however, 
a market-based approach, and particularly the concept of  
WSWB, had become the cornerstone of  government’s land 
reform policy. 
In South Africa, in the context of  land reform, the 
concept of  WSWB has come to mean something quite 
distinct. The willing sellers are again private landowners, but 
the choice available to them is not simply to sell or not to sell 
as it was in Zimbabwe. Rather, owners are free to sell to the 
highest bidder or the buyer of  their choice. Thus, landowners 
can actively avoid offering their land for sale for land reform 
purposes, say on racist grounds, and still dispose of  their land 
on the ‘open market’. The state does not have the power of  
first refusal and the intended beneficiaries have to compete 
for available land on ‘the open market’, at market prices. 
It is when we examine the concept of  ‘willing buyer’, 
however, that we see the greatest divergence from past 
models, as the entire concept is transferred from the state 
to the intended beneficiaries. Simple ‘willingness’ on the part 
of  landless people, however, is no guarantee that they will be 
able to enter the land market or that they will be able to secure 
the land they need. People in need of  land are dependent not 
only on the co-operation of  the land owners, but also on 
Introduction
The concept of  ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ (WSWB) has 
dominated the discourse on land reform in South Africa 
since 1994 – indeed, it can be described as one of  the defining 
characteristics of  the programme, distinguishing if  from most 
other land reforms around the world. This simple-sounding 
concept has not just been central to government thinking 
on land reform, but has also become a key ideological 
battleground, assuming the status of  a ‘non-negotiable’ 
among landowners and an object of  contempt for landless 
people and their supporters. Yet, despite its prominence, 
this so-called principle has received remarkably little critical 
analysis, from either its supporters or its critics. 
The concept of  WSWB is widely attributed to the 
influence of  the World Bank, but this is inaccurate in 
a number of  respects. Since the early 1990s, the World 
Bank has indeed advocated what it calls market-assisted (or 
market-led, or market-based, or, more recently, ‘negotiated’) 
land reform in countries around the world, and was a key 
influence on the thinking of  the African National Congress 
(ANC) during the transition to democracy. The approach 
advocated by the World Bank, however, has generally been 
part of  a wider strategy that includes selective expropriation, 
land taxes, subdivision of  landholdings, and negotiated ‘exit 
strategies’ for current landowners. Such an approach was 
set out in the key 1994 World Bank document, South African 
agriculture: Structure, performance and options for the future. In 
practice, the South African model has diverged considerably 
from the World Bank prescriptions, particularly in its reliance 
upon WSWB mechanisms.
WSWB in southern Africa
The term WSWB has some history of  usage in South Africa, 
particularly around the operation of  the Expropriation Act of  
1975, under which the price paid for expropriated property 
is determined by reference to the price that would be paid 
for the property were it to be exchanged between a willing 
seller and a willing buyer. In this context, WSWB refers to an 
imaginary ideal, rather than an actual practice. 
The concept of  WSWB also appears to have been 
influenced by the course of  land reform in Zimbabwe, where 
it had a very particular meaning rooted in the Lancaster House 
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the willingness of  the state to approve their application and 
provide the necessary funding. 
While the state has (in theory) the power and the resources 
to enter the land market on behalf  of  beneficiaries, it has 
chosen not to do so. Rather, it provides grants to would-be 
beneficiaries who themselves must enter the market, identify 
a ‘willing seller’ (that is, a property for sale) and secure an 
agreement from the owner to sell at an agreed price. If  a 
‘willing buyer’ is said to exist, it may refer neither to the state 
(which does not buy land on its own behalf  or own initiative) 
nor to the intended beneficiaries (who only become effective 
buyers once they secure state approval and funding). Rather, 
it represents an abstract concept, a hybrid of  state and would-
be beneficiaries, supposedly acting in unison.
‘Willing seller’ accurately denotes the lack of  compulsion 
on landowners, but ‘willing buyer’ offers no guarantees to 
the landless that they will acquire the land they want, or 
indeed any land at all. The concept of  ‘willing seller’ (and 
the payment of  market prices) fully protects the interests of  
existing landowners, as it neither compels them to sell against 
their will nor at a price with which they are not fully satisfied. 
No such guarantees or protections are offered to would-be 
beneficiaries, who continue to depend on state approval of  
their grant applications and the willingness of  owners to 
transact with them. 
We can therefore conclude that the South African land 
reform programme can best be described as a ‘willing seller’ 
programme; it would appear that the element of  ‘willing 
buyer’ was added in a frivolous attempt at rhetorical symmetry, 
suggesting (spuriously) that the interests of  buyers and sellers 
are equally protected, and perhaps symbolising a (non-existent) 
harmony at the heart of  our land reform policy. 
Moving beyond the market
WSWB, as applied in South Africa, has three main elements – 
the discretionary powers of  landowners (the landowner veto), 
the price (compensation) paid to landowners, and the role of  
the state in assisting would-be beneficiaries to acquire land. 
Debates to date have tended to focus largely around the first 
two, with landless people and their supporters calling for the 
state to take a more interventionist approach, both in terms of  
identification of  suitable land and the level of  compensation 
paid to owners. Implicit in this demand is a new relationship 
between the state and the landless, whereby the state would 
still be guided by the demands expressed by landless people 
(that is, the call is not for a ‘supply-led’ approach) but would 
intervene more decisively on their behalf  in order to acquire 
the land they need. This suggests a radical overhaul not only 
of  the concept of  ‘willing seller’, but also of  ‘willing buyer’.
WSWB has granted enormous discretionary power to 
landowners to influence the pace and direction of  land 
reform in South Africa, tantamount to a veto over the land 
reform process. Under the redistribution programme – but 
also, to a considerable extent under restitution and tenure 
reform – landowners may choose whether to sell or not sell 
their property, to whom they will sell, and at what price. If  
a landowner is not interested in selling, there is effectively 
nothing that can be done within the WBWS framework to 
change the situation. 
If  landowners want to sell their land, but not to land 
reform beneficiaries, they are within their rights to do so. If  
landowners do not accept the prices offered by government/ 
beneficiaries (who exactly drives the negotiation with the 
landowner is a matter of  debate), they are free to refuse to 
sell or to withdraw from the transaction; they are fully within 
their rights to choose their own preferred buyer, even if  this 
is not the highest bidder. In a worst case scenario, a co-
ordinated effort by landowners to refuse to sell to any land 
reform beneficiary could bring the entire land redistribution 
programme to a halt. Such is the power that has been granted 
to landowners under the WSWB policy.
Closely related to the discretionary power of  landowners 
to sell or not to sell is the matter of  price. WSWB has been 
interpreted to mean that ‘full market value’ will be paid by 
the state for all land reform transactions. Full market value is 
variously interpreted as the asking price of  the seller or the 
estimate of  market value made by an independent valuer. In 
theory, the latter should provide a reliable indication as to 
what price the land in question would fetch if  it was offered 
for sale on ‘the open market’. In many cases, however, this is a 
purely notional amount, as the state may be the only interested 
buyer, as in restitution cases or in cases where owners cannot 
find another buyer due to encroachment of  informal 
settlements. Thus, the current policy can best be described as 
the payment of  ‘market equivalent price’, regardless of  what 
the land might realistically fetch on the open market. 
Land reform in South Africa is widely claimed to be 
‘demand-led’, but under WSWB this has been interpreted to 
mean a minimal role for the state, no matter what the level 
of  ‘demand’ expressed by landless people within a particular 
area. In practice, the state’s role has been limited to processing 
grant applications from those capable of  following the 
approved procedure, and releasing funds, subject to the 
reaching of  agreements with landowners and the availability 
of  funds within the specific year (not always a certainty). The 
state does not accept responsibility for the identification 
or acquisition of  land for the landless, or for overcoming 
landowner resistance. 
A departure from WSWB could mean changes in all 
three of  the above areas, but it does not necessarily mean a 
complete departure from ‘the market’, or ‘market-based’ land 
reform, as some commentators have suggested. How this 
might work in practice is considered next. 
Ending the landowner veto
The choice of  whether or not to make land available for land 
reform currently rests almost entirely with landowners. This 
power – effectively a veto over land reform – needs to be 
addressed, both to increase the supply of  land for land reform 
purposes, and to ensure that sufficient land is made available 
in areas where it is most needed. This could be achieved by 
means of  selective expropriations in areas where sufficient 
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land is not coming onto the market, or where negotiations 
with landowners are not fruitful, or where excessive prices are 
being demanded. Such expropriations (with compensation) are 
adequately provided for in the Constitution. 
There does not appear to be a compelling argument for 
widespread expropriation at this stage. Rather, selective 
expropriations as part of  a concerted land acquisition strategy 
(still based largely on market purchases and negotiated sales), 
should be sufficient to increase the overall supply of  land and 
to ensure that land is available in areas of  acute need. The key 
requirement is a credible threat of  expropriation, which in turn 
requires that expropriation is actually used from time to time.
An additional step would be to grant the state the right of  
first refusal on all land sales. This would be a major undertaking, 
as it would involve the state in every land transaction in the 
country, the majority of  which would probably not result in 
land reform purchases. Furthermore, it would not, on its own, 
ensure that sufficient land would be made available, or that 
the right land (that is, land of  adequate quantity and quality 
in areas of  high demand) would be made available. There is 
also no guarantee that the price of  land would be reduced as 
a result of  such an approach, and disagreement over price 
would again raise the need for expropriation. Moreover, the 
bureaucratic complexity and potential disruption to the land 
market resulting from the right of  first refusal could be much 
greater than selective expropriation as outlined above. 
Another option that has been discussed since before 1994 
is a land tax. This would not remove the landowner veto 
over sales, but it would be expected to increase pressure on 
landowners to release land onto the market, and could also 
serve to dampen land prices. Arguments for and against land 
tax extend well beyond land reform, but it is generally held to 
be anomalous that South Africa, with a high concentration 
of  land ownership in the hands of  a small minority, and a 
stated policy of  land redistribution, does not have such a tax 
in place. A land tax could, of  course, be used in combination 
with the other options outlined above.
Just and equitable compensation
Compensation for landowners is arguably the core issue in the 
WSWB debate. Representatives of  landowners have indicated 
that they might tolerate some restrictions on the free market 
in land as long as they were compensated in line with market 
values. Among the landless, the payment of  sub-market prices 
has become almost an article of  faith, with some voices calling 
for minimal or no compensation for landowners. 
The Constitution is clear when it comes to payment for 
land acquired by means of  expropriation. Compensation must 
be ‘just and equitable’, striking a balance between the interests 
of  all affected parties. Market value is just one factor that must 
be taken into consideration when calculating compensation, 
the others being the current use of  the property, the history 
of  acquisition and use, past state subsidies and the purpose of  
the expropriation.
Compensation based on such a formula is likely to be 
considerably below the prices currently being paid, but would 
meet the constitutional requirement of  ‘just and equitable 
compensation’. 
An alternative would be to pay productive value rather 
than market value. Productive value is based on the estimated 
productivity of  the land when used for agricultural purposes, 
and is typically somewhat below the prevailing market value. 
Productive value is widely used by the commercial banks as 
a basis for calculating the collateral value of  a farm, and has 
been used internationally as a basis for compensation in land 
reform. It is likely that the use of  productive values would be 
resisted by landowners, and be seen as a form of  expropriation, 
but it provides a well-established basis (perhaps as one of  
a range of  factors) that could be used in the calculation of  
compensation that is ‘just and equitable’. Here and elsewhere 
a distinction would have to be made between payment for the 
land itself  and the fixed improvements that have been added 
by the landowner. 
Empowering the landless
Whatever the method of  land acquisition, or the form of  
compensation paid, major questions remain as how the 
supply of  land can be matched to the demand for land 
from the landless and land hungry. Currently, this is left to 
the ‘invisible hand’ of  the market which, in practice, makes 
it the responsibility of  the landless themselves to identify 
land that is for sale and enter into negotiations with the 
landowner. This is a fundamental weakness of  current land 
reform policy, based as it is on major inequalities of  power 
and resources between potential buyers (typically first-time 
buyers) and sellers (typically experienced landowners and 
market operators). 
Despite its key role in funding the land reform process, 
under WSWB the state has not taken responsibility for 
identifying land on behalf  of  the landless nor for initiating 
negotiations with landowners. Nor does it accept land that 
is offered to it by landowners, regardless of  the price, on the 
basis that land can only be acquired on behalf  of  identified, 
and approved, beneficiaries. Experience of  land reform since 
1994 suggests there is a need for the state to play a much 
more active intermediary role in order to better match supply 
and demand. This does not necessarily mean a departure 
from market principles (or market prices), but rather that the 
state shifts from being a passive to an active participant in 
land transactions. 
For example, the state could take responsibility for 
acquiring land once a clear demand has been identified in 
a particular area. Similarly, the state could proactively enter 
negotiations with landowners in order to assess the potential 
supply of  land and the cost implications. In such scenarios, 
there would be no need for direct negotiations (or even 
contact) between sellers and beneficiaries. The conventional 
argument that the state must under no circumstances become 
the owner of  land, even temporarily, is a major obstacle to 
effective land reform and must be challenged. 
More indirect methods that do not require direct 
negotiation with landowners should also be used to acquire 
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land. Much agricultural land is currently sold by means of  
public auction but, due to the complex approval process for 
land reform grants, would-be beneficiaries are incapable of  
participating in such sales. The state should, therefore, find a 
means by which it can participate on behalf  of  the landless, 
Another source of  land, which has not been adequately 
utilised to date, is property repossessed by the state-owned 
Land Bank and other commercial bank. Government should 
develop agreements with all the banks to enable it to secure 
such properties, perhaps through a right of  first refusal, 
guided, as always, by clearly identified needs in particular 
areas. Considerable cost savings can be expected through this 
route, as repossessed farms are often sold at below ‘market 
value’.
A proactive land redistribution programme with an actively 
engaged Department of  Land Affairs (DLA) in the driving 
seat presupposes clear strategies based on detailed assessment 
of  land needs in particular areas and for acquiring land by 
various means. This requires that planning for land reform 
needs to be done for every municipal area in the country, and 
that DLA needs to build close working relationships with 
both landowners and the landless. It also points to a much 
greater role for municipalities in developing land reform plans 
for their respective areas (ideally, as part of  their integrated 
development plans – IDPs) and facilitating dialogue between 
the various stakeholders. Formal responsibility for land reform 
would still rest with national government, as stipulated in the 
Constitution, but identification of  land needs and solutions 
should be driven by local participatory processes at the 
municipality level. 
Conclusion 
This paper has sketched some of  the challenges associated 
with the transition from a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model 
of  land reform to a more proactive and people-driven 
approach that can better match land supply and demand 
and meet the needs of  radical agrarian transformation. A 
realistic alternative to WSWB requires that all key elements 
are addressed – abolishing the landowner veto, drawing up 
practical guidelines for ‘just and equitable’ compensation, 
and proactive engagement by national government (through 
DLA) with landowners, the landless, and the range of  state 
and non-state agencies capable of  playing a supporting role 
in land reform. 
An important first step would be an unambiguous 
message from government that it is committed to reaching 
the land reform targets that it has set, and that it will make use 
of  a range of  instruments to bring this about. In other words, 
it must serve notice on landowners that the veto powers they 
have enjoyed over land reform up to now have been revoked 
and that it is in their interest to find a negotiated solution to 
large-scale land redistribution. 
For this to be convincing, and effective, government must 
address the question of  resources, both human and financial. 
It is unlikely that the current staff  complement of  DLA – in 
terms of  numbers and skills – is sufficient to manage a large-
scale, proactive programme of  land reform. In addition, the 
budget for redistribution has been allowed to stagnate and, 
regardless of  the methods of  land acquisition to be used in 
future, will need to be increased. 
Furthermore, government must make a realistic 
assessment of  the legal instruments at its disposal, and 
develop procedures to allow these to be used effectively 
(with legislative amendments where necessary). Policies 
and procedures that cause lengthy delays in the processing 
of  land reform applications, and release of  funds, and that 
discriminate against very poor applicants requiring small areas 
of  land for ‘subsistence’ purposes, will also require review. In 
other words, the state must equip itself  with the resources 
and policies necessary to be an effective agent of  pro-poor 
land reform.
The lessons of  the past eleven years show that the free 
market and a laissez-faire state cannot deal effectively with all 
these elements. The Constitution places clear responsibility 
on the state to bring about land reform, and no other 
institution in South Africa can possibly play this role. The 
challenge, therefore, is not to abandon ‘the market’ entirely, 
but to end the market fundamentalism that has characterised land 
policy since 1994; to bring the state back in to land reform, to 
play the central role that most stakeholder believe it should, 
and of  which only it is capable. 
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